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Abstract The article analyses the usage of multilevel tools (such as cooperation among international or-
ganizations, regional instruments, activities of regional and national courts and private subjects’ actions) 
in the social rights’ protection field. A closer look is given at the cooperation among international organiza-
tions (the ILO and the IMF, the World Bank Group, the OECD, the WTO and the UN) and at one of regional 
collaboration models within the sphere of workers’ rights protection: the North American Agreement on 
Labour Collaboration (NAALC). Within the scenario where balance between political and judicial powers 
is no longer affected only at national level but should be considered also from multilevel perspective, the 
redefinition of the role and responsibility of regional and national courts plays an important role in the 
protection of fundamental social rights. It is worth mentioning the mutual influence between the CJEU 
and the ECtHR in their fight against discrimination. On a national level, the role of national Constitutional 
Courts in the field of fundamental social rights is analyzed in different countries (Asia, Europe and South 
America). Finally, the article studies the adoption of transnational instruments by private actors – com-
panies and trade unions – that collectively or individually try to protect social rights at work. Two specific 
instruments have been chosen: transnational company agreement and code of conduct. 
Summary Introduction. – 1. Global Perspective or Regional Collaboration Model? – 2. A “Virtous 
Example” of Fundamental Rights Protection at the Regional Level: the “Cross-fertilization” between 
the European Union and the Council of Europe on Anti-discrimination Law. – 3. A Brief Overview of the 
Role of Constitutional Courts in Various Countries and Fundamental Social Rights. – 4. Private Actors: 
Transnational Company Agreements and Corporate Codes of Conduct. – 4.1. Transnational Company 
Agreements. – 4.2. Corporate Codes of Conduct. – 5. Conclusion.
Keywords Social rights’ protection. Institutional collaboration. International Labour Organization. 
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Introduction
In the times when we find: States in crisis, the phenomena like social 
dumping, delocalization and weakness of trade unions at national and 
international level, there’s a need to consider whether we should stop 
focusing only on traditional ways and instruments for the protection of 
fundamental social rights and try to identify and use new, alternative 
and “soft” tools to protect all individuals at work in the global market.
There are many possible ways which can involve a wide range of actors: 
more or less intensive cooperation between international organizations, 
different ways of regional models of cooperation between the States and 
regional courts or the adoption of transnational instruments by private 
subjects, like trade unions or companies. 
Which model or way to protect fundamental rights is the most effective, 
most probable to bring some (positive) results? 
Of course, first we should answer the question what social rights should 
be considered as “fundamental”. The answer to this question remains 
beyond the scope of this article, though. Instead, it appears to us that in 
order to reach a consensus about the need of effective intervention in the 
protection of social rights’ field, the usage of multilevel tools by different 
actors might be appropriate. 
1 Global Perspective or Regional Collaboration Model? 
Looking from a global perspective, the first question to be answered 
would be whether the International Labour Organization (ILO) stands 
alone in the battle for the protection of social rights or it needs a common 
strategy with the “Big Brothers”. 
Considering the fact that a current seat of the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) in Geneva is occupying the same building that previously 
hosted the ILO staff the question of cooperation becomes more subtle 
and symbolic. 
The cooperation between ILO and other international institutions has 
been improving since the emergence of latest jobs crisis in 2008. The 
reasons and causes of the crisis have increased the participation of the 
ILO in international debate to tackle the crisis. The in-house subjects to 
the ILO such as decent work and social protection floors have been widely 
used by all international actors.
The focal point of this cooperation is G20 process which gathers ma-
jor economies of the world with a representation over 85% of the gross 
world product, 80% of world trade, and two-thirds of the world popula-
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tion1. When the financial and economic crisis spread across the globe 
in 2008, the leaders of the G20 countries deployed a plan to strengthen 
further international cooperation and coherence. In carrying out their 
work, the members of the G20 draw on the experience of technical ex-
perts of international organizations, chiefly the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank Group, the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development (OECD), the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
the United Nations (UN), the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the 
ILO. The milestone of this joint approach on social policies has become 
evident with the establishment of Taskforce on Employment under the 
French Presidency in order to support G20 Labour and Employment Min-
isters Meetings2. The latest display of this cooperation can be found in 
two new reports which were submitted to the G20 during Labour and 
Employment Ministers Meeting in Melbourne on 10-11 September 2014. 
The first report3 prepared by the ILO, the OECD and the World Bank 
Group focuses on G20 labour markets with a view to respond to current 
challenges. The second one4 prepared jointly by the ILO, the OECD, the 
IMF and the World Bank Group addresses specifically the promotion of 
gender-balanced economies. Both reports incorporate predominantly the 
sensitivities and previous views of the ILO, such as the decent work and 
quality jobs. The ILO’s presence is also detectable in the G20 Labour and 
Employment Ministerial Declaration, as the text reads «However, there is 
a continuing need to generate hundreds of millions of decent jobs that can 
lift working families out of poverty and drive sustainable development»5. 
As for the collaboration between the ILO and the IMF, these two or-
ganisations have come together to stimulate a discussion on international 
cooperation and policy innovation that could improve the capacity of econ-
omies to generate enough good jobs to strengthen the social cohesion. 
In 2010 a joint high-level IMF-ILO conference in Oslo6 took place where 
1 About G20: G20 Members, in https://www.g20.org/about_g20/g20_members (2014-11-12).
2  OECD and G20, G20 Employment Task Force, in http://www.oecd.org/g20/topics/em-
ployment-and-social-policy/ (2014-11-12).
3 G20 Labour markets: outlook, key challenges and policy responses, in http://www.ilo.
org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/multilateral-system/ g20/reports/WC-
MS_305421/lang--en/index.htm (2014-11-12).
4 G20 Achieving stronger growth by promoting a more gender-balanced economy, in http://
www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/multilateral-system/g20/reports/
WCMS_305422/lang--en/index.htm (2014-11-12).
5  The G20 Labour and Employment Ministerial Declaration Melbourne Meeting 10-11 Sep-
tember 2014, in http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/dcomm/docu-
ments/meetingdocument/wcms_307551.pdf (2014-10-20).
6 http://osloconference2010.org/index.htm (2014-10-20).
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new ways of forging a sustainable, job-rich economic recovery were ex-
plored7. Moreover, in 2011 the IMF renewed attention to the issue of jobs, 
inequality and growth by creating a «Working Group on Jobs and Inclusive 
Growth»8. In addition to that, the participation of Director-General of the 
ILO to the IMF’s annual International Monetary and Financial Committee 
can be considered as the acceptance of the ILO as a regular stakeholder. 
The Committee9 which is one of two ministerial committees of the IMF’s 
decision-making body – the Board of Governors –, is one of the few suit-
able fora in IMF structure to reiterate social concerns. In its last meeting 
the Director-General of ILO stressed the need for strengthening demand 
and supply side employment and social policies10.
As for the cooperation between the ILO and the World Bank Group11, 
both organisations share similar challenges: poverty and exclusion, a 
global financial and jobs crisis and growing inequality. However, each 
organization has different approach to the issues related to the global 
trade and globalization. Even the necessity of sanctions for not respecting 
the ILO’s core labour standards was questioned in 90’s by researchers 
from the World Bank Group12. Throughout the history the mission of the 
World Bank Group evolved from being a facilitator of post-war reconstruc-
tion and development to the present-day mandate of worldwide poverty 
alleviation. Among other activities the World Bank Group prepares an-
nually the ‘Doing Business Report’ which is criticisable from the view-
point of the ILO. The report ranks countries for their performance on 
easiness of hiring and firing workers. This methodology always leads to 
controversy over the protection of labour which is the core of the ILO’s 
mission. Even within the organisation, this methodology has been the 
focal point of discussions and an independent panel was convened for 




9 For IMF’s Governance Structure see: https://www.imf.org/external/about/govstruct.
htm (2014-10-20).
10  ILO Statement to the International Monetary and Financial Committee 11 October 2014, 
in http://ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/who-we-are/ilo-director-general/statements-
and-speeches/WCMS_312630/lang--en/index.htm (2014-10-20).
11  The World Bank Group is composed by five organizations: the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, the Inter-
national Finance Corporation, the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, the Inter-
national Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, in http://www.worldbank.org/en/
about (2014-10-20).
12  Maskus, Should Core Labour Standards Be Imposed Through International Labour 
Policy?, in Policy Research Working Paper, no. 1817, 1997.
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the review of existing method. The Independent Doing Business Report 
Review Panel initiated by the President of World Bank Group Jim Yong 
Kim has concluded that the reliance to a narrow information source and 
usage of aggregate rankings are the major shortcomings of the report13. 
The ILO has also expressed its dismay on ‘Doing Business Report’ on 
various occasions. In its previous evaluations the ILO emphasized that 
the methodology of employing workers indicator within the report yields 
a narrow and misleading view of the employment environment for busi-
ness and this attitude results in a ranking in which some countries with 
a strong and competitive private sector are placed at the lower end14. The 
cooperation of these two organisations has improved with the impetus 
of G20 process: the common ideals generated a new synergy for creation 
of new development patterns, especially for emerging economies based 
on job-rich growth. 
Recently, one could notice some kind of willingness to change the at-
titude towards labour issues in the World Bank’s Social Protection and 
Labour Strategy 2012-202215, to which preparation has contributed also 
the ILO. In fact, the discussions in previous International Labour Confer-
ences (in 2012 and 2013) on social protection floors have helped to pre-
pare the Strategy. The ten-year Strategy calls for investing in stronger 
social protection and labour systems, expanding the reach of social safety 
nets – programmes which should protect families from shocks, help to en-
sure that children grow up healthy, well-fed, and stay in school and learn, 
empower women and girls and create jobs. The intermediate results show 
that social safety programmes launched in developing countries have 
indeed lifted about 50 million people from absolute poverty (living on 
less than 1.25 $ per day)16. 
Another partner of the ILO is the OECD which promotes policies that 
shall improve the economic and social well-being of people around the 
world. The mandate of the OECD goes far beyond the ILO’s but the labour 
policies are an undisputed part of the OECD’s daily business. The col-
laboration between the OECD and the ILO has various aspects, such as 
13  Statement from the Independent Panel in http://www.dbrpanel.org/ (2014-10-20).
14  The United Nations and reform: Developments in the multilateral system, in http://
www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/documents/meetingdocument/
wcms_085125.pdf (2014-10-20).
15  Resilience, Equity, and Opportunity-World Bank’s Social Protection and Labour Strat-
egy 2012-2022, in http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resourc-
es/280558-1274453001167/7089867-1279223745454/7253917-1291314603217/SPL_Strat-
egy_2012-22_FINAL.pdf (2014-10-20).
16  The State of Social Safety Nets 2014, 33, http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/
default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/05/12/000350881_20140512111223/Rendered/
PDF/879840WP0FINAL00Box385208B00PUBLIC0.pdf (2014-10-20).
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corporate social responsibility (CRS), social security, job creation, labour 
migration, etc. In 2011 two organisations have concluded a memoran-
dum of understanding17 to strengthen their cooperation and coordination 
in fields of common interest and activity. The ILO’s contribution to the 
preparation of the policies to respond existing financial crisis remains 
the main course of action within this collaboration. 
The question is whether this kind of global collaboration between in-
ternational organizations is enough? Maybe we should look back inside 
the ILO and give more powers to the ILO itself? In the recent past, the 
international community tried to establish, although unsuccessfully, a 
strong relationship between trade and labour and between an economic 
organization and the ILO. Indeed, we shall recall the Havana Charter18 
that was supposed to create a strong linkage between trade and labour 
standards, and between the International Trade Organization (ITO) and 
the ILO. 
The ITO, though, never came into existence because of the lack of the 
willingness of some of its creators19. The question arises whether it should 
be feasible and realistic, instead, to give to the ILO the power to apply 
economic sanctions for non-compliance with the ILO labour standards. 
Though, it could have an effect of decreasing number of ratifications of 
the ILO conventions, still considering the fact that lately it is getting 
more and more difficult to get a consensus between the 185 ILO Mem-
bers on the adoption of new conventions, maybe we could assume that 
the ratification is not so important anymore, at least for some Member 
States of the ILO. The CSR initiatives, like ILO’s Tripartite declaration of 
principles concerning multinational enterprises and social policy (known 
as MNE Declaration)20, the Global Compact21 and the OECD’s Guidelines 
17 Memorandum of Understanding between ILO and OECD, http://www.oecd.org/global-
relations/48013743.pdf (2014-10-20).
18 Final Act of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment (Havana Charter) 
(1947), Art. 7.3 «In all matters relating to labour standards that may be referred to the Or-
ganization … it shall consult and co-operate with the International Labour Organization», 
http://www.wto.org/english/ docs_e/legal_e/havana_e.pdf (2014-10-20).
19  Hastedt, Encyclopedia of American Foreign Policy, United States, 2004, p. 182, 498; 
Trofimov, The Failure of the International Trade Organization (ITO): A Policy Entrepreneur-
ship Perspective, in Journal of Politics and Law, 2012, vol. 5, no. 1, p. 57, in http://www.
ccsenet.org/jpl (2014-10-20).
20  Tripartite declaration of principles concerning multinational enterprises and social 
policy, in http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_094386/lang--en/index.htm 
(2014-10-20).
21 The United Nations Global Compact, in https://www.unglobalcompact.org/ (2014-10-20).
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for Multinational Enterprises (known as OECD MNE Guidelines)22 might 
act as facilitators for extending the core labour standards to all countries 
regardless the ratification barrier.
Or maybe instead of focusing on global perspective, regional instru-
ments and collaboration models among States which have similar econom-
ic, political and cultural environment (but not necessarily) are easier to 
implement. One of the examples of such regional collaboration is NAALC 
(North American Agreement on Labor collaboration)23. It is a ‘side agree-
ment’ to a free trade agreement concluded between USA, Canada and 
Mexico (NAFTA – North American Free Trade Agreement) in force since 1 
January, 199424. All three Member States have different level of the pro-
tection of workers’ rights and their enforcement. The idea of NAALC is to 
find a compromise between the harmonization of some labour standards 
and the application of international labour standards with a very impor-
tant cross-border monitoring mechanism how Member States comply 
with their obligations under NAALC. It was supposed to create a strong 
linkage between trade and compliance of (national) labour laws with the 
possibility to apply economic sanctions. 
According to NAALC25, labour law consists of 11 guiding principles 
«… that the Parties are committed to promote, subject to each Party’s 
domestic law. …». Therefore, the commitments of the Member States 
under NAALC regards the implementation of (some) national labour laws 
covering the enumerated labour principles. A “novelty” of this Agreement 
is the monitoring how the States comply with obligations assumed under 
NAALC: it is a cross-border monitoring mechanism with the submissions 
regarding the violations of labour principles to be filled with National 
22 OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises, in http://www.oecd.org/corporate/
mne/ (2014-10-20).
23  About NAALC see among others: Atleson, Compa, Rittich et al., International Labor 
law: cases and materials on workers’ rights in the global economy, Thomson West, 2008; 
Hepple, Labour laws and global trade, Hart Publishing, 2005; Bronstein, International and 
comparative labour law. Current challenges, Palgrave Macmillian, ILO, 2009; Compa, Labour 
rights in the FTAA in Globalization and the future of labour law, edited by Craig, Lynk, 2011; 
Blanpain, Corbett, Zimmer et al., The Global workplace International and comparative em-
ployment law-Cases and materials, 2007; Perulli, Diritto del lavoro e globalizzazione. Clau-
sole sociali, codici di condotta e commercio internazionale, Padova, 1999; Zanobetti, Diritto 
internazionale del lavoro. Norme universali, regionali e dell’Unione europea, Milano, 2011; 
Piquer, NAALC: an effective compromise? in Global Law Working paper-New York University 
School of Law, 2005, no. 1; Singh, NAFTA and Labor: A Canadian perspective, in Journal of 
Labour Research, 2002, XXIII, no. 3, p. 434.
24  For more information regarding NAFTA visit the website of the US Trade Representa-
tive office at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/north-amer-
ican-free-trade-agreement-nafta.
25  Annex 1 NAALC. Full text of the NAALC is available at http://new.naalc.org/naalc/
naalc-full-text.htm. 
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Administrative Office (NAO) based in another country(s), other than the 
one where the violation has occurred26.
In relation to procedural rules for the violation of the “guiding prin-
ciples” we can group them into three categories and each category can 
go through certain stages of procedure27. Most submissions received by 
NAOs were related to the violation of the collective labour rights28 which 
are grouped within the first category principles and can pass only the 
first stage of the procedure that ends with the ministerial level discus-
sions29. One could suspect that it might be a diplomatic solution for the 
violation of very important workers’ rights. 
Despite its limited application with regards to all enumerated labour 
principles, the cross-border monitoring mechanism how national labour 
laws in each Member State are observed could be considered as a new 
tool for workers, trade unions and human rights NGOs to draw the at-
tention of the society in each Member State, in the region or even on a 
broader level. It could be considered like another, maybe soft law, in-
strument to combat for the better and safer workplace environment at 
national-regional level. The major part of submissions were presented 
shortly after the adoption of NAALC, against Mexico as it was expected, 
and in relation to the violations of collective labour rights which can go 
only through the first stage of the procedure30, during which the “uncom-
fortable” questions are resolved through diplomatic channels. And the 
other two stages of the procedure, mainly the Expert committee and the 
Arbitral panel with the possibility to apply economic sanctions were never 
used31. So the parties had no chance (or lack of will) to test the function-
ing of this unique co-operational model. 
If we take a look at the most recent submissions regarding the viola-
tion of NAALC labour principles in all three Member States we will find 
out that the last submission with the USA office was made in 201132 (and 
26  See Art. 16.3. NAALC. 
27  See: Arts 27-41 NAALC and Atleson, Compa, Rittich et. al, op. cit., p. 282 ss.
28 See: NAALC Public Communications and Results, 1994-2008, table available at http://
new.naalc.org/userfiles/file/NAALC-Public-Communications-and-Results-1994-2008.pdf.
29  See Arts 27-41 NAALC.
30  Bronstein, op. cit., p. 105.
31  Bronstein, ibidem.
32 USA NAO Submission 2011-02, available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agree-
ments/naalc.htm (2014-10-25).
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is still under review) and the same is true for Canadian33 and Mexican34 
NAOs. Whereas the last biennial report dates 2008-200935. Apparently, 
«… [some] broader discussion among the Parties to improve the imple-
mentation of North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC)» 
are taking place36.
Notwithstanding its limits and unclear future, «the NAALC is intended 
as a review mechanism by which member countries open themselves 
up to investigations, reports, evaluations, recommendations and other 
measures so that over time enhanced oversight and scrutiny will gener-
ate more effective labour law enforcement»37. 
While looking for other existing models of regional collaboration that 
would involve different type of actors we find one within European region 
between two judicial institutions belonging to different legal systems, 
namely the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European 
Court of Human Rights.
2 A “Virtous example” of Fundamental Rights Protection  
at the Regional Level: the “Cross-fertilization” between  
the European Union and the Council of Europe  
on Anti-discrimination law
The “cross-fertilization” between the European Union (EU) and the Coun-
cil of Europe (CoE) on the right not to be discriminated, one of the core 
ILO values listed in the 1998 Declaration, should be taken into considera-
tion as a “virtuous example” of the synergy in the protection of funda-
mental rights at regional level.
Although the two organizations aim at preventing discrimination in 
33 Canadian NAO Submission 2011-01, available at http://www.labour.gc.ca/eng/rela-
tions/international/agreements/naalc_pub_comm.shtml#comms (2014-10-25).
34 Mexican NAO Submission 2011-01, available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/trade/agree-
ments/naalc.htm (2014-10-25).
35  Commission for Labor Cooperation, Bi-annual report 2008-2009, http://new.naalc.org/
userfiles/file/INFORME-ING%20051110(1).pdf (2014-10-25). 
36  Statement of the NAALC Council on the Secretariat of the Commission for Labor Co-
operation of the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation, http://www.naalc.org/
index.cfm?page=751&artcat=4&article=56 (2014-10-25).
37  Compa, op. cit., p. 252.
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different areas and fields, with different goals38 and tools39, they started 
a spontaneous interaction on anti-discrimination conducts long before 
the introduction of the Art. 6 TEU, providing for the accession of the EU 
to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and stating that 
the fundamental rights set forth by the ECHR shall constitute general 
principles of the Union’s law40.
The interaction between these regional actors has been developed by 
means of a spontaneous phenomenon of mutual influence and endorse-
ment, sometimes silent, sometimes accompanied by an interesting case-
law cross-reference41, between the European Court of Justice (CJEU) and 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
The complex influence at issue, as pointed out by several studies recent-
ly42, albeit very unsystematically43, has led both the CJEU and the ECtHR to 
reach a higher protection of the fundamental right not to be discriminated.
38 On the difference between the EU and the CoE on that issue see: Haverkort, Speeken-
brink, European Non-Discrimination Law. A Comparison of EU Law and the ECHR in the Field 
of Non-Discrimination and Freedom of Religion in Public Employment with an Emphasis on 
the Islamic Headscarf Issue, in School of Human Rights Research, 2012, vol. 59; Council of 
Europe, Hanbook on European non discrimination law, Publications office of the European 
Union, Luxemburg, 2011; European Commission, The Prohibition of Discrimination under 
European Human Rights Law. Relevance for the EU non-discrimination directives – an update, 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxemburg, 2011; Nicholas, 
Prohibited Grounds of Discrimination under EU Law and the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights: Problems of Contrast and Overlap, in Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal 
Studies, 2006/2007, vol. 9, p. 1 ss.
39  The European Union law includes a wide range of provisions prohibiting discrimina-
tory conduct, e.g.: several articles of the Treaties (Arts 18, 19, 45, 157), five Directives 
(Dir. 2000/43/EC, Dir. 2000/78/EC, Dir. 2004/113/EC, Dir. 2006/54/EC, Dir. 2010/41/UE) 
and Art. 21 CFREU; while the CoE’s tool against discrimination is only Art. 14 ECHR and 
its quite recent Protocol 12.
40  See Gragl, The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention of Human 
Rights, Hart Publishing, 2013.
41  See infra.
42  Busby, Zahn, The EU and the ECHR: Collective and Non-discrimination Labour Rights 
at a Crossroad, in International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Rela-
tions, 2014, vol. 30, no. 2, p. 153 ss.; Burri, Towards More Synergy in the interpretation of 
the Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in European Law? A Comparison of Legal Contexts and 
some Case Law of the EU and the ECHR, in Utrecht Law Review, 2013, vol. 9, no. 1, p. 80 
ss.; Besson, Gender Discrimination under EU and ECHR Law: Never Shall the Twain Meet?, 
in Human Rights Law Review, 2008, vol. 8, no. 4, p. 647 ss.; Douglas, Scott, A tale of two 
courts: Luxemburg, Strasbourg and the growing European human rights aquis, in Common 
Market Law Review, 2006, vol. 43, no. 3, p. 629 ss.
43  Bruun, Prohibition of Discrimination under Article 14 European Convention on Human 
Rights, in European Convention on Human Rights and the Employment Relation, edited 
by Dorssemont, Lorcher, Schoemann, Hart Publishing, 2013; European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, Council of Europe, Handbook on European non discrimination law, 
op. cit., p. 377; Defeis, Human Rights and the European Union: Who Decides? Possible Con-
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In fact, the CJEU, by referring to the ECHR and to the ECtHR case-law, 
transformed the principle of anti-discrimination whose original scope was 
merely to facilitate the functioning of the common market, into a general 
principle of the EU long before the Amsterdam Treaty44. 
Likewise the influence of the EU law and the CJEU jurisprudence has 
led the ECtHR to move beyond the skinny provisions of the ECHR con-
cerning the prohibition of discrimination. In fact, as a consequence of this 
influence the ECtHR, without emending the Art. 14 ECHR, has not only 
enriched the relevant notion of discrimination, e.g. including the concept 
of indirect discrimination, but also reinforced the protection thereto, al-
lowing victims to rely on statistics in order to shift the burden of proof 
to the defendant (i.e. the allegedly discriminating party)45.
In a nutshell, the EU anti-discrimination law and the case-law of the 
CJEU has been a ‘flywheel’ used by the ECtHR for the development of 
the protection against discrimination and vice versa. In fact, on the one 
hand, the CJEU, through the ECHR and the ECtHR case-law has started 
enhancing the role of the right not to be discriminated much before the 
EU started to focus on the human rights; on the other hand, the ECtHR, 
referring to the EU law and to the CJEU case-law started to develop, 
through the years, a more elaborated concept of discrimination, leaving 
room for more discretion and activism to the Court with regards to the 
interpretation and application of the Art. 14 ECHR. 
The contribution of both these regional actors to the development of the 
anti-discrimination principle shows not only that «human rights provide 
flicts Between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights, in 
Dickinson Journal of International Law, 2001, vol. 19, no. 2, p. 301 ss.
44  Murray, The influence of the European Convention on fundamental rights on community 
law, in Fordham International Law Journal, 2010, vol. 33, no. 5, p. 1388 ss. 
45  The most clear example of this evolution is expressed in ECtHR case (GC), D.H. and 
Others v. Czech Republic (Appl. no. 57325/00) where the Court expressly talks about indi-
rect discrimination (see para. 184 where the Court says: «The Court has already accepted 
in previous cases that a difference in treatment may take the form of disproportionate-
ly prejudicial effects of a general policy or measure which, though couched in neutral 
terms, discriminates against a group… In accordance with … Council Directives 97/80/EC 
and 2000/43/EC … such a situation may amount to ‘indirect discrimination’, which does not 
necessarily require a discriminatory intent») and after a few lines endorses the mechanism 
of the shift in the burden of proof (see § 186 ss. where the Court says: «Where an applicant 
alleging indirect discrimination … establishes a rebuttable presumption that the effect of a 
measure or practice is discriminatory, the burden then shifts to the respondent State, which 
must show that the difference in treatment is not discriminatory». To justify this reasoning 
the Court expressly rely on the European Union case-law saying that «The recent case-law 
of the Court of Justice of the European Communities considers that where an applicant 
alleging indirect discrimination thus establishes a rebuttable presumption that the effect 
of a measure or practice is discriminatory, the burden then shifts to the respondent State, 
which must show that the difference in treatment is not discriminatory»).
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a fresh focus for European integration in a new millennium»46 but also 
that the interaction among regional actors sometimes works. This is why 
it should be taken into much more consideration as a valid tool for the 
protection of fundamental rights.
3 A Brief Overview of the Role of Constitutional Courts  
in Various Countries and Fundamental Social Rights 
When talking about the protection of fundamental social rights it is im-
portant to take into account not only the collaboration between the two 
“apical” Courts at the European regional level, i.e. the ECtHR and the 
CJEU, but to have a quick glance at the role of Constitutional Courts as 
well. Constitutional Courts have different structures, compositions and 
perform functions which may vary from country to country.
Europe (including EU Member States and candidate countries such 
as Turkey) is characterized by the presence of various kinds of Courts: 
national courts, Constitutional courts, the CJEU and ECtHR47.
If we turn East, towards Japan, we point out firstly that there is no 
Constitutional Court in Japan. Therefore, the function of the constitu-
tionality control belongs to the ‘ordinary’ courts48. According to the 
Art. 81 of the Constitution of Japan49 the Judiciary has the power to 
determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official 
government action. Unlike in some European countries (e.g. Italy, Ger-
many) where the constitutionality is judged by the court regardless of 
the existence of an individual litigation, in Japan the Judiciary cannot 
determine the constitutionality of an act, unless a matter concerning 
its application is referred to the court50 (similar system can be found in 
the United States).
46 Douglas, Scott, op. cit., p. 629.
47  See in general: Sciarra, Integration Through Courts: Article 177 as a Pre-federal Device, 
in Labour Law in the Courts, edited by Sciarra, Hart Publishing, 2001 p. 1 ss.
48  Japanese judicial system is composed of the Supreme Court, and as Lower Courts, the 
High Court (role of appeal Court), the District Court (first instance), the Family Court, the 
Summary Court. So there isn’t a category of the “ordinary” courts.
49 «The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitu-
tionality of any law, order, regulation or official act». See more: http://www.japanesel-
awtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=2&re=01&dn=1&yo=&ia=03&kn[]=%E3%81%AB&_x=1&_
y=17&ky=&page=2.
50 Luney, Jr., The Judiciary : Its organization and Status in Parliamentary System in Japanese 
Constitutional Law, edited by Luney, Jr., Kazuyuki Takahashi, University of Tokyo Press, 
1993, p. 128.
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In relation to labour, the Japanese Constitution provides that «Stand-
ards for wages, hours, rest and other working conditions shall be fixed 
by law» (Art. 27 para. 2) and «The right of workers to organize and to 
bargain and act collectively is guaranteed» (Art. 28). For example, based 
on these constitutional provisions some labour laws were enacted, such 
as Labour Standards Law based on Art. 27 para. 2 and Trade Union Law 
based on Art. 28. 
Thus, in Japan, the social fundamental rights based on the Constitu-
tion are materialized by these laws and it is rare that employers violate 
minimum criteria assured by legal acts, therefore cases concerning the 
constitutionality question judged in the courts are few51. One of such 
cases was Zen-norin Keishoku-ho case52 concerning the prohibition of the 
right to do dispute act for civil servants in public sector by law. Despite 
the Art. 28 of the Constitution, National Public Service Act53 and Local 
Public Service Act provide general prohibition for public employees to 
strike54. The legal society has insisted on the unconstitutionality of such 
provisions but when the case reached the Supreme Court it has declared 
that the prohibition to strike for public servants was constitutional. This 
judgment has been strongly criticized, until now.
In conclusion, although Japan has no constitutional court, the social 
fundamental rights of the Constitution are generally assured by legisla-
tion and employers’ practice, except for the right to collective action for 
public employees. 
Moving back to Europe, Constitutional Courts play a significant role in 
EU Member States, as well as in the rest of the countries which belong to 
the Council of Europe, like Turkey that it is not yet a member of the EU. 
The Turkish Constitutional Court55 deals with question of constitution-
ality of the acts enacted by the Parliament56. This question is usually 
raised by an opposition party but also the President of the Republic, par-
liamentary group of the party in power and at least one-fifth of Turkish 
51  One of the reasons might be the fact that the constitutionality of legal act is strictly 
verified by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau before its adoption.
52 Supreme Court Grand Bench  25 April, 1973, in Kei-shu, 1973, vol. 27, no. 4, p. 5471.
53 The text is available at http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=2
&re=01&dn=1&yo=&ia=03&kn[]=%E3%81%93&_x=12&_y=13&ky=&page=46.
54  When talking about the status of public employees and public character of the work 
performed, the Supreme Court has given the priority to ‘the public welfare’ based on the 
Art. 13 of the Constitution over the Art. 28. For more on this topic see: Araki, Labor and 
Employment Law in Japan, Japanese Institute of Labor, 2002, p. 10.
55 According to the Art. 146 of the Constitution, the Constitutional Court is composed of 
seventeen members. The term of office is twelve years, non-renewable (Art. 147).
56  See in general: Ozbudun, Turk Anayasa Hukuku, 2014. 
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Grand National Assembly members have the right to present an annul-
ment action to the Constitutional Court57. 
Another function of Turkish Constitutional Court is to examine whether 
a specific article of a legal act is contrary to the Constitution. This appeal 
can be made by the civil, administrative and military courts, in relation 
to specific case pending at the court.
With regards to the protection of fundamental rights, individual ap-
plication – “constitutional complaint” – was introduced into Turkish legal 
system by constitutional amendments in 2010. According to the Art. 148 
of the Constitution, anyone who thinks that his/her constitutional rights 
set forth in the ECHR have been infringed by the public authority has a 
right to apply to the Constitutional Court after exhausting other admin-
istrative and judicial remedies.
One particular constitutional complaint has touched the relationship 
between constitutional rights and political dimension in Turkey. The 
case caused friction between Turkish political power and the Consti-
tutional Court as it concerned the suppression of social networks (like 
Twitter, Youtube and Google Public) and the exercise of the freedom of 
expression58.
The direct appeal to the Constitutional Court contested the violation 
of the freedom of expression as protected by the Turkish Constitution 
(Art. 26) and a number of international conventions ratified by Turkey, 
most notably the ECHR. In the spring 2014 the Constitutional Court ac-
cepted the complaint concerning the right to be informed and ordered 
the reopening of the internet sites that had been blacked out59.
If we turn towards the South, we will find Peru with Constitutional 
Court composed from seven members elected by the Congress for the 
five-year period60. The Court is entrusted with the defence of the principle 
of constitutional supremacy, whether laws or acts of State bodies’ comply 
with the provisions of the Constitution.
One particular tool for the protection of fundamental rights in Peruvian 
system, and other systems of Spanish derivation, is the acción de amparo, 
an action for the protection of constitutional rights.
 The acción de amparo operates in case of an act or omission by any 
authority, official, or person that violates or threatens different rights rec-
57  See the official website of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Turkey http://
www.anayasa.gov.tr/en/Powers (2014-10-25).
58  See Sirin, Turkiye’de Anayasa sikayeti, Bireysel Basvuru, 2013.
59  For ‘Twitter’ judgement visit http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskiler/2014/04/20140403-18.
pdf (2014-11-12). For ‘Youtube’ judgement visit http://www.resmigazete.gov.tr/eskil-
er/2014/06/20140606-10.pdf (2014-11-12).
60  See the website: http://www.tc.gob.pe/ (2014-11-12).
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ognized by the Constitution of Peru, including the right to work (Art. 27 
of Constitution states that ‘The law grants the worker suitable protection 
against unfair dismissals’). The Constitutional Court hears, as a court of 
last resort, decisions refusing petitions of amparo. 
The great influence that Constitutional Court in Peru has in labour 
matters can be seen from the criteria imposed in the last decade to the 
work stability regime. The Court has redefined the dismissal regime and 
specified the temporary recruitment regime61.
If we take a look at various EU countries, Constitutional Courts play 
different role and have different structure62. For example, Belgium, Ital-
ian and Portugal have plaid a peculiar role.
In Belgium there are twelve judges in the Constitutional court, which 
has two types of procedures: annulment of unconstitutional legal acts and 
preliminary ruling – through the ordinary judicial system (if requested 
by a party the judge must refer to the constitutional court). 
With reference to the protection of fundamental social rights, in 2011 
the Belgian Constitutional Court stated in a preliminary ruling that the 
difference between employees and workers (ouvriers) contained in Bel-
gian laws63 is contrary to the Constitution. It therefore ordered the legis-
lator to harmonize the two statutes within a period of two years64. 
If we look at Italy and Portugal65 we can notice a significant new trend 
with regards to the role of Constitutional Courts66.
In Italy, the Court is composed of fifteen judges and has been playing an 
important role in the field of the protection of fundamental social rights 
since 1960s-1970s. In fact, from the 1960s the Court has increased its 
61  See Villavicencio Ríos, El derecho al trabajo: en tránsito del despidolibre al derecho 
constitucional garantizado, in http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/derechopucp/ar-
ticle/view/8906 (2014-11-12).
62  See Claes, De Witte, The role of national Constitutional Courts in the European legal 
space, in The Role of Constitutional Courts in Multilevel Governance, edited by Popelier, 
Mazmnyan, Vandenbruwaene, Cambridge, Antwerp, Portland, 2013, p. 79 ss.
63 E.g. Law of 3 July 1978 concerning contracts of employment (Loi du 3 juillet 1978 rela-
tive aux contrats de travail) established different periods of notice (délais de préavis) with 
regards to dismissals depending on whether an employee (employé) or a worker (ouvrier) 
was concerned.
64  Judgment 7 July 2011 no. 125/2011 available at http://www.const-court.be (2014-11-12).
65 Coelho, Caro de Sousa, ‘La morte dei mille tagli’. Nota sulla decisione della Corte costi-
tuzionale portoghese in merito alla legittimità del bilancio annuale 2013, in Giorn. dir. lav. 
rel. ind., 2013, p. 527 ss.
66  See Gomes, Social Rights in Crisis in the Eurozone. Work Rights in Portugal, in Social 
Rights in Times of Crisis in the Eurozone: The Role of Fundamental Rights Challenges, edited 
by Kilpatrick, De Witte, in EUI Working Paper LAW, n. 5, 2014, p. 78 ss., in http://cadmus.
eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/31247/LAW%20WP%202014%2005%20Social%20Rights%20fi-
nal%202242014.pdf?sequence=1 (2014-11-12). 
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realm of influence to protect and establish fundamental social rights at 
national level67.
The Italian Constitutional Court’s most recent trend to decide from a 
multilevel perspective can be noticed if we consider the case concern-
ing social rights of public employees: the decision n. 207 on the fixed 
term contract in public sector (fixed term contracts for school teachers) 
in 201368 was the first occasion in which the Constitutional Court made a 
preliminary reference to the CJEU. In its request for preliminary ruling 
the Constitutional Court defined itself as a ‘national court” referring to 
the CJEU. In this sense, the Italian Constitutional Court encouraged the 
dialogue between courts at multilevel system. 
Finally, it is interesting to analyse the case of Portugal. In 2013-2014 
the Portuguese Constitutional Court, composed by thirteen judges, has 
stepped in this multilevel system, taking a position with significant re-
sponsibility at the national level and replying to the international insti-
tutions, so called Troika, composed of European Commission, European 
Central Bank and International Monetary Fund.
In fact, in the last two years, Portugal’s Constitutional Court struck 
down several austerity measures proposed by the government after the 
indications of the Troika, including salary cuts in the public sector. Por-
tugal’s Court ruled against the planned salary cuts in the public sector, 
undermining one of the key elements of spending cuts set out in the 
international bailout. As reported by the media, in May 2014, Portugal’s 
Court ‘ruled out cuts in pensions, sickness and unemployment benefits 
stating that the measures contravened the rights of citizens spelled out 
in the constitution’69.
From the perspective of fundamental social rights the Portuguese case 
is the most significant – the Courts’ redefinition of their roles and re-
sponsibilities affects the balance of (political and judicial) powers that no 
longer only operate at a national level but also at a multilevel perspective, 
where international institutions are involved.
67  See Andreoni, Lavoro, diritti sociali e sviluppo economico, Torino, 2006, p. 265-308.
68 See Lo Faro, Fundamental rights challenges to Italian Labour Law developments in the 
time of economic crisis: an overview, in Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the Eurozone: 
The Role of Fundamental Rights Challenges, edited by Kilpatrick, De Witte, in EUI Working 
Paper LAW, n. 5, 2014, p. 60 ss.
69  See http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/05/31/us-portugal-court-idUSKBN0EB-
0DO20140531 (2014-11-12).
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4 Private Actors: Transnational Company Agreements  
and Corporate Codes of Conduct
4.1 Transnational Company Agreements
After the discussions about global and regional models of collaboration, 
the analysis of the dialogue between the two European Courts and the 
role of national Constitutional Courts in the field of fundamental social 
rights, the look at the ways private actors, collectively or individually, try 
to protect (some) social rights at work would be appropriate. 
Transnational company agreements (TCAs) are one of the manifesta-
tions of the phenomenon of transnational collective bargaining (TCB). 
While some experiences of TCB exist at sectorial or cross-sectorial level, 
principally within the EU, it seems that the tendency is to favour conclu-
sion of agreements between trade unions (or more generally worker’s 
representatives) and employers at transnational company level. However, 
this kind of agreement, which is often said to be one of the answers to the 
always growing internationalisation of economic exchanges, gives rise to 
lots of questions. Some questions are legal ones – What is the legal na-
ture of these agreements? By whom can these agreements be concluded? 
How do they relate with national legal systems? –, others more political 
in a broad sense – What do these agreements mean with regards to the 
relationships between trade unions and employers, between trade unions 
themselves and between legal entities forming multinational nexus of 
enterprises? It is not our ambition here to deal with all these important 
questions. We will focus on legal instruments existing or proposed in the 
EU and briefly indicate some reflexions about the opportuneness of TCAs. 
The EU legal system contains some instruments that may be relied on 
trying to solve difficulties occurring after the conclusion of transnational 
agreement70. It lacks, though, of an instrument specifically dealing with 
the legal issues we have just mentioned. Thus, some are pleading for the 
adoption of a legal mechanism at the EU level which could be used by 
social partners having concluded an agreement at transnational level to 
give it binding legal effects, if they want to give it such effects, i.e. an op-
tional mechanism71. Two important propositions have been made during 
70  E.g. Regulations Rome I and Rome II. On this issue see among others: Van Hoek, Hen-
drickx, International private law aspects and dispute settlement related to transnational com-
pany agreements, Study undertaken on behalf of the European Commission VC/2009/0157, 
Final Report, Annex I, 2009 in http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=4816&lan
gId=en (2014-11-12).
71  They are among others academics but also European institutions. See e.g. the Euro-
pean Parliament resolution of 12 September 2013 on cross-border collective bargaining 
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the last decade by academics to define how it could operate72. Both pro-
posals insist on the necessity to involve trade unions in TCB, giving more 
marginal role to representative bodies of workers, e.g. European Works 
Councils. This position is justified by the need to guarantee the power of 
influence to the workers’ negotiating agents, as well as their legitimacy 
to conclude collective agreements. But they differ from each other with 
regards to the very nature of transnational agreements. The “Ales Re-
port” proposes a legal framework which could be used both at sectorial 
and company levels and whose effectiveness would rely on managerial 
decisions taken by each enterprise covered by the agreement and recog-
nized as legally binding in each EU Member State. The “Sciarra Report”, 
a more recent one, deals only with TCB at company level and promotes a 
system principally based on a mediation procedure rather than on legally 
binding act enforceable in the courts. This is justified, according to the 
authors of this proposal, by the fact that «Building relationships based 
on trust between management and workers’ representatives is one of the 
priorities for signatory parties of TCAs»73. 
This assertion raise us a question whether there is indeed no real will 
from social partners’ side to give biding legal effects to transnational 
agreements, as it is the case with collective agreements concluded at 
national level. In this respect it is interesting to try to determine why 
social partners have concluded such agreements in the past. It has been 
said that on the employers’ side, one important reason for adopting a 
TCA is often an issue of external promotion directed towards consumers. 
TCAs would be in that way another instrument of CSR, besides codes of 
conduct (see infra, par. 4.2), which is effective principally thanks to the 
sanctions from the market74. Another reason would be the will to create 
a stronger feeling of unity among different entities composing a multi-
national company by the internal promotion of common shared values75. 
and transnational social dialogue (2012/2292(INI)), in http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2013-0386+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN (2014-11-12).
72  Ales, Engblom, Jaspers, Laulom, Sciarra, Sobczak, Valdès Dal-Ré, Transnational col-
lective bargaining: past, present and future, Report to the European Commission, in http://
ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=4641&langId=en (2014-11-12) and Sciarra, Fuchs, 
Sobczak, Towards a legal framework for transnational company agreements, Report to the 
European Trade Union Confederation, in http://www.etuc.org/publications/towards-le-
gal-framework-fortransnational-company-agreements#.VFS2sWft48M (2014-11-12). 
73  Sciarra, Fuchs, Sobczak, op. ult. cit., p. 30.
74  Barreau, Arnal, Responsabilité sociale de l’entreprise, comité d’entreprise européen 
et négociation collective transnationale – l’exemple du groupe ACCOR, in http://www.cairn.
info/revue-negociations-2010-2-page-21.htm.
75  Daugareilh, La négociation collective internationale, in Travail et Emploi, 2005, n. 104, 
pp. 69, 76.
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On the workers’ side, the main reason would be to create obligations for 
the company to respect, protect or promote some rights related to work 
within its own entities and by the mean of its commercial contracts. It 
sounds obvious: trade unions are unified against the drifts of capitalism 
and promote solidarity between workers all around the world. But a re-
cent survey has shown that with regards to TCB it is far from reaching 
unanimity among European national trade unions76. Indeed, the attitude 
of trade unions depends on various factors, like e.g. differences between 
national traditions and sectors of activity. It, thus, appears that both 
from the employers’ side and the workers’ side, in reality it is not always 
self-evident that TCAs should have a legally binding effect, neither that 
there should be a TCAs at all. 
Aside from these considerations of opportuneness, when assessing the 
existing practice of TCAs, another element of a structural nature should 
be taken into account as well. It is the absence of regulation of transna-
tional collective actions77. Could TCAs even have another aim than that 
of improving relationships based on trust, if trade unions are refrained 
from organising collective actions at transnational level because of the 
legal uncertainty with regards to the consequences of such actions, i.e. 
if there is indeed no other mean than trust to lead employers to conclude 
such collective agreements? 
4.2 Corporate Codes of Conduct
From the last decades of the twentieth century, multinational companies 
have begun to adopt various measures to make publicly known their CRS. 
One of the instruments used is code of conduct which can be defined as «a 
statement of minimum standards together with a pledge by the company 
to observe them and to require its contractors, subcontractors, suppliers 
and licensees to observe them»78.
These public declarations create one single level of environmental and/
or social standards applicable in all countries in which the company is 
economically active and independently from the differences among the 
applicable national laws. 
The main feature of the code of conduct is that companies adopt it vol-
76  Furaker, Bengtsson, On the road to transnational cooperation? Results from a survey 
of European trade unions, in European Review of Labour and Research, 2013, vol. 19, p. 161.
77  On this issue, see among others Dorssemont, Van Hoek, Collective action in labour 
conflicts under the Rome II regulation (Part I), in European Labour Law Journal, 2011, vol. 2, 
p. 48, 74.
78  EU Green Paper ‘Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social Responsibility’. 
Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 2001.
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untarily. Usually the code is unilaterally drafted by the company but there 
are cases in which companies adhere to the code of conduct prepared 
by a third party (NGOs, governments, international organizations, etc.). 
However, the use of either requires a free and voluntary decision of the 
company. There are several reasons for companies to adopt such kind of 
instruments but the most important seems to be the concern about the 
corporate image.
Despite the fact that it is unilateral, the code of conduct can involve 
non-traditional actors such as NGOs or consumers who can put some pres-
sure on the company to comply with it. The participation of these actors 
can contribute to the effectiveness of the code.
When adopting these codes of conduct companies are free to select 
labour standards they undertake to respect. This “pick and choose” may 
determine that a code of conduct will end up being just a marketing tool, 
without an effective impact. Indeed, the standards included in the codes 
can be chosen by the companies to suit their private interests without 
considering the needs of the workers (the freedom of association or other 
rights can be not included, for instance). The content of a code of conduct 
can be influenced by different factors, such as the sector of activity (e.g. 
in the textile industry most of the workers are women, therefore the 
codes of conduct usually contains anti-discrimination and gender equality 
clauses). It is however important to mention that during the last decades 
the content of these codes became more precise regarding the rights 
selected, including references to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work or specific ILO conventions, the OECD 
Guidelines, etc. 
The code can be applied to the workers of the multinational company 
itself or it can also be applicable to the workers of its subcontractors 
(supply chain), such as in the manufacturing sector, which is very highly 
delocalized and decentralized and where the brand and image are very 
important79. When it is applied to the supply chain by the mean of a clause 
inserted into the contracts with the suppliers, there is a risk that the main 
aim pursued by the company by the application of the code is to protect 
the company in case of scandal related to the supplier’s activities. Indeed, 
such clause permits the company to terminate the contract and ‘clean its 
hands’ regarding the behaviour of its contractors. Even though it is not 
its purpose, this sanction would affect the supplier’s workers (despite the 
fact that the aim was to protect their fundamental rights)80.
79  Sanguineti Raymond, La tutela de los derechos fundamentales del trabajo en las cadenas 
de producción de las empresas multinacionales, in Derecho del Trabajo. Tendencias Contem-
poráneas, Editora y Libreria Juridica Grijley E.I.R.L, 2013, p. 309, 329.
80  Daugareilh says that these clauses are “authentic small social clauses” that can pro-
duce the same perverse effects as social clause, since the failure of the other party can 
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The code of conduct has no legally binding effect as it is a unilateral 
instrument that companies adopt on a voluntary basis. However, it can 
have some legal consequences depending on national or supranational 
regulations or depending on the insertion of a specific clause in the con-
tracts that the company concludes with its suppliers81. One of these po-
tential legal consequences can be found in the Art. 6 of Directive 2005/29 
«Unfair Commercial Practices Directive»82 which states that if a company 
does not respect to what it has committed itself by adopting a code of 
conduct, such a conduct may be considered as a misleading action under 
the wording of the Directive, and thus can lead to the application of fines.
As stated by Adalberto Perulli, the major weakness of a code lies in 
the application and monitoring procedures because generally the control 
systems are carried out by the companies themselves83. This control could 
be improved if the company appoints an independent third party (whose 
conclusions are not affected by the contractual link with the company) 
and it would be improved much more if the company would allow the 
workers to participate in this control process through their representa-
tives (e.g., trade unions). A supplementary difficulty lies in the fact that 
the code of conduct is not always well known in all the places where the 
company develops its activities.
At the end, the aim of the codes of conduct seems to be the promotion 
of a good reputation of the company and not necessarily the protection of 
the social rights. For this reason the main way to guarantee the respect 
of the code of conduct can be the pressure that the stakeholders put on 
the company through information campaigns, boycotts and other kind 
of reactions to the non-compliance with the code’s provisions84. Despite 
be solved effectively by a legal sanction (suspension or termination of the contract), which 
economic implications are obvious. Daugareilh, Responsabilidad social de las empresas 
transnacionales: análisis crítico y prospectiva jurídica, in Cuadernos de Relaciones Labo-
rales, 2009, vol. 27, no. 1, p. 77, 94, in http://revistas.ucm.es/index.php/CRLA/article/
viewFile/CRLA0909120077A/32243 (2014-11-12).
81  As stated by Marrella, if the business parties declare that the code of conduct is incor-
porated into their contract, the soft law provisions of the code are transformed into legally 
enforceable contract clauses, even in the territory of nation States which are not parties to 
specific human rights treaties. See: Marrella, Human Rights, Arbitration, and Corporate 
Social Responsibility in the Law of International Trade, in Economic Globalisation and Human 
Rights edited by Benedek, De Feyter, Marrella, 2007, p. 302 s.
82 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 
concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market.
83  Perulli, Globalisation and Social Rights, in Economic Globalisation and Human Rights 
edited by Benedek, De Feyter, Marrella, 2007, p. 125.
84  It happened in the case of the factory Jerzees de Honduras, which in 2008 announced 
the end of its operations leaving 1,200 workers unemployed. That decision was related to 
the violation of the right of freedom of association, as the consultant Adrian Goldin con-
166 Marinelli et al. Multilevel Tools for Protection of Social Rights: a Hypothesis
Ricerche giuridiche, 4, 1, 2015, pp. 145 -166 ISSN 2281-6100
all the limits of the codes of conduct, they have served as a tool for the 
protection of fundamental social rights in some cases and might continue 
to do it in the future.
5 Conclusion 
The recent economic crisis has put a new emphasis on the already well 
known fact that the answer to the social problems can no longer come 
from the States alone. The economy is now global and interconnected: 
labour law, if it wants to fit within this evolution, has to be re-organised 
in a way which takes into account the new framework of commercial ex-
changes. However, there is no global institution powerful (nor legitimate) 
enough to impose norms on economic or public private actors. As things 
stand, it therefore seems that a satisfying protection of social rights at 
international level could be reached only through a synergy between all 
existing actors active at different levels of “regulation” – international, 
regional, national, and transnational – and application of all possible so-
cial rights protection tools. According to the brief overview contained in 
this article, we still have a long way to go. 
cluded. At the end, the pressure made by the students (more than 100 universities from 
United States and Canada discontinued their contracts) forced Russell Athletic to rehire the 
workers and take other measures to their advantage. For more information about this case 
see: Goldin, La libertad sindical y las iniciativas voluntarias; el caso de Jerzees de Hunduras, 
in El derecho a la negociación colectiva. Liber Amicorum al Profesor Antonio Ojeda Avilés, 
edited by Gorelli Hernández, Consejo Andaluz de Relaciones Laborales, Consejo Andaluz 
de Relaciones Laborales, Sevilla, 2014, p. 191 ss.
